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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of the Marine Corps Reserve
appropriations. The purpose of this thesis is to look at the
relationship between the active and reserve components within the
Marine Corps from the perspective of the funds appropriated by
Congress. The research examines the history of the Marine Corps
reserve appropriations from 1960 to the post Cold War era (1990's).
Of particular concern is how the Marine Corps Reserve has fared in
an environment of shrinking Department of Defense resources.
Addressed will be the impact of the Total Force Policy, the Base
Force concept, and the Bottom-Up review on the Marine Corps
Reserve. In order to show trends, similarities, and differences,
the budget data for both the active and reserve components is
analyzed, i.e., end strength, personnel funding, and operation and
maintenance funding. The data is analyzed within the framework of
decades, i.e., the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's. This
research will show that the Marine Corps Reserve has not only grown
in size, but also in its ability to augment, reconstitute, and
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Since 1916, when President Woodrow Wilson signed an Act of
Congress officially appropriating funds for the Marine Corps
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve has served a critical role in the
security of the United States. From the first utilization of the
Marine Corps Reserve in World War I to the reserves who served in
Desert Storm/ Shield, the Marine Corps Reserve has always provided
qualified units and individuals to support the active component
when necessary. The purpose of this thesis is to take a look at
the relationship between the active and reserve components within
the Marine Corps from the perspective of the funds appropriated by
Congress.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research examines the history of the Marine Corps Reserve
appropriations from 1960 to the post Cold War era (1990's). The
thesis will address the following questions:
* In a period of shrinking resources, how have the reserve
appropriations within the Marine Corps been treated in
correspondence with reductions in the active duty
appropriations of the Marine Corps?
* What has been the relationship between the Marine Corps
Reserve and the active duty appropriations since 1960?
* How has the Total Force Policy affected funding for the
Marine Corps Reserve?
* How has the Base Force concept and the Bottom-Up review
affected the future of the Marine Corps Reserve?
C. DISCUSSION
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War,
the United States finds itself as the only superpower in the world.
With the Soviet threat no longer a major concern, the Department of
Defense is currently in the midst of major budget reductions. With
resources shifting away from the Department of Defense, a major
dilemma has been the allocation of funds to active duty forces as
opposed to the allocation of funds to the part-time reserves.
Congress has historically supported an increase in the reserves
because the reserves are a constituency and are cheaper than their
active duty counterparts. Conversely, the Department of Defense
has continuously proposed proportionate reductions to reserves in
conjunction with the active duty forces. The Department of
Defense's contention is that future threats to U.S. security would
not allow enough lead time to organize, train, and deploy




With the issue of whether or not to proportionately increase
or decrease the reserves with the active component, the scope of
the thesis is to analyze the funding and end strengths of both the
active and reserve components of the Marine Corps since 1960.
Chapter II will give a background of the Marine Corps Reserve.
This background will consist of a history of the reserves from
1916 to the 1950' s and an explanation of the personnel and
operation and maintenance appropriations of the Marine Corps, i.e.,
2
RPMC, O&MMCR, MPMC and O&MMC. Additionally, a brief explanation is
provided on the tables and figures. Lastly, the various categories
within the Marine Corps Reserve will be explained to provide a
better understanding of the various types of reservists comprising
the Marine Corps Reserve.
Chapters III through VI will analyze budget data from the
above mentioned appropriations to show trends, similarities and
differences. The data will be analyzed within the framework of
decades, i.e., the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's. In
conclusion, based on the data in Chapters III through VI, Chapter
VII will determine the relationship between the active and reserve
components of the Marine Corps and look at the future of the Marine
Corps Reserve.
E. METHODOLOGY
To determine the relationship between the reserve and active
duty appropriations, budget data was gathered and analyzed from a
variety of sources. The Budget of the United States for fiscal
years 1960 through 1994 provided vital data. The current Future
Years Defense Program has provided critical information for fiscal
years 1995 through 1999. The numerous studies conducted on the
reserves by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) , the RAND
Corporation, and the Marine Corps Research Center, were critical in
gaining insight into the direction of the Marine Corps Reserve in
the 1990's.
F. BENEFIT
Through this research both active and reserve personnel will
have a better understanding of the Marine Corps Reserve and its
funding support patterns. With the data that has been gathered,
the Marine Corps will have more information available when making
policy decisions concerning the allocation of resources to the
active and reserve components. A secondary benefit is that the
data presented in this thesis is a step in alleviating the
"us" v. "them" syndrome that has existed between the active and
reserve establishment. Lastly, hopefully this thesis will show the
signficance of the Total Force Policy and also lend added support
to the bridge that allows the active and reserve components of the
Marine Corps to work as a team.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an overview
of the Marine Corps Reserve from its inception in 1916 through the
1950' s. This chapter will give the reader a historical perspective
of the reserves and set the stage for the 1960's. Also an
explanation of the appropriations being analyzed will be given,
along with an explanation of the tables and figures. Lastly, a
brief outline of the various reserve categories is presented.
B. THE BEGINNING OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE
Since the inception of the Marine Corps Reserve in 1916, its
mission has been to provide trained and gualified individuals and
units to support the active component in time of national
emergency. Its members have served valiantly in all major
conflicts from World War I to Desert Storm/Shield. Their
dedication and professionalism are in keeping with the highest
traditions of the Marine Corps.
In April 1917, the United States declared war on Germany, at
which time the Marine Corps Reserve consisted of three officers and
thirty-two enlisted reservists. 1 Because the Marine Corps Reserve
was still in its infant stages as an organization, direct and
'Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps
Reserve - A History . Division of Reserve, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 9.
specific involvment of the Marine Corps Reserve is not clearly
documented. Official records were often combined without specific
distinction made to whether an individual was a regular or a
reservist. 2 But from 1917 to the end of the war the initial
reserve end strength of thirty-five (three officers, thirty-two
enlisted) grew to roughly 7 000. ? As the war came to an end, the
reserve end strength saw a significant decrease.
C. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1920' S AND 1930'
S
The early 1920 *s saw the Marine Corps Reserve end strength
decline even further. The Marine Corps Reserve as an organization
lacked direction and found itself having to justify its existence
during a time of peace.
Not until 1925 did the Marine Corps Reserve receive clear
policy guidance. Robert Aguilina explains:
In February 1925, Congress passed an act to provide for the
creation, organization, administration and maintenance of a
Naval Reserve and a Marine Corps Reserve. This new Act put the
Marine Corps Reserve on solid footing and provided many new
features lacking under the abolished 1916 Act. 4
Even though the Act of 1925 gave the Marine Corps Reserve a clear
purpose and direction, lack of funding prevented reservists from
participating in adequate training. With the formation of the
Marine Corps Reserve Officer's Association (MCROA) in 1926, an
2Ibid., p. 9.
3Robert Aquilina, "Reserves: Over 75 Years of Readiness,"
Marines (Official Magazine of the U.S. Marine Corps) , Vol. 20,
No. 8, August 1991, p. 25.
4Ibid., p. 25.
organization of reservists with strong civilian ties, the reserves
were able to wield their influence in Congress. The objectives of
MCROA were to foster professionalism among reserve officers,
promote the interests of the United States Marine Corps and to
preserve the security of the United States. 5
Despite its early problems as an organization, the reserves
continued to grow. With Germany flexing its military muscle
throughout Europe, the world seemed to be on the brink of war
again. The Act of 1938 provided increased funding for the reserves
and abolished the Act of 1925.
D. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN WORLD WAR II
In November of 1940, President Roosevelt mobilized the Marine
Corps Reserve in response to the outbreak of war in Europe. The
reserves would comprise sixty-eight percent of the total Marine
Corps end strength of 485,000. During the war, eighty Marines
received the Medal of Honor; forty-four of these were Reservists. 6
The Commandant of the Marine Corps during World War II, General
Vandegrift, explains the role of the reserves:
During WW II, Marine Reserves constituting the bulk of the
Marine Corps had a major share in its wartime achievements.
Unfailingly they demonstrated that espirit de corps which is
the heritage of all Marines." 7
5BGen. Russell A. Bowen, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps
Gazette
. Vol. 51, No. 8, August 1967, p. 12.
6Aguilina, 75 Years
, p. 26.
70fficers, A History , p. 102.
After the war, the Marine Corps Reserve continued to grow. Because
of the strong legislation that had been passed during the 1920'
s
and the 1930' s, the reserves had a clear mission and Congressional
support.
E. MARINE CORPS RESERVE DURING THE KOREAN WAR
Because of its clear mission, the Marine Corps Reserve found
itself well prepared for the Korean War in 1950. Aquilina
explains:
By late 1949, the Director of Reserve's status report showed an
organization of more than 100,000 officers and men. The post-
war rebuilding process had moved along well, and reflected the
time, effort and money the Marine Corps was putting into the
program. This investment in a trained, Ready Reserve was to
pay off less than one year later/
Table 2.1 shows the active and reserve end strength following World
War II and prior to the Korean War.
TABLE 2.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1945-1950
Year Active Duty Reserves not on Active Duty Total
1945 469,925 — 469,925
1946 155,679 22,807 178,732
1947 93,053 45,536 132,589
1948 84,988 111,122 196,110
1949 85,965 132,817 209,782
1950 74,279 128,962 203,118
Source: CNA study, 1992
The reservists proved to be extremely valuable because
"...the ground forces in the entire fleet Marine Force were
KAguilina, 75 Years , p. 27.
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insufficient to field a 22,000 man war-strength division." 9 The
active duty Marine Corps was essentially a hollow force that was
supplemented by a strong reserve force. The reserves fought with
valor and honor as reflected by their thirteen Medals of Honor,
fifty Navy Crosses and more than 400 Silver Stars. 10 In essence,
the Korean War showed how valuable a well trained reserve component
can be.
Following the Korean War, the United States found itself
continously preoccupied with containing the spread of communism.
With the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, the reserves received further
support, and training programs were restructured to ensure the
readiness of the reserves. This restructuring was to continue
throughout the 1960's.
F. EXPLANATION OF MARINE CORPS APPROPRIATIONS
In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of
the appropriations addressed in this thesis, the following
definitions are provided:
MPMC: Military Personnel. Marine Corps
Provides funds for pay, allowances, individual clothing,
interest on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station
travel (including all expenses thereof for organizational
movements) , and expenses of temporary duty travel between
permanent duty stations, for members of the Marine Corps on
active duty (except members of the Reserve provided for
elsewhere)
.
90fficers, A History , p. 164.
10Aguilina, 75 Years , p. 28.
9
RPMC: Reserve Personnel. Marine Corps
Provides funds for pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence,
gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the
Marine Corps Reserve on active duty under section 265 of title
10, United States Code, or while serving on active duty under
section 672(d) of title 10, United States Code, in connection
with performing duty specified in section 678(a) of title 10,
United States Code, or while undergoing reserve training, or
while performing drills or equivalent duty, and for members of
the Marine Corps platoon leaders class, and expenses authorized
by section 2131 of title 10, United States Code, as authorized
by law; and for payments to the Department of Military
Retirement Fund.
O&MMC: Operation & Maintenance. Marine Corps
Q&MMCR: Operation & Maintenance. Marine Corps
Reserve *
These appropriations finance the costs of operating and
maintaining the Marine Corps, including the Reserve component,
except military personnel pay, allowances and travel costs.
Included are amounts for pay of civilians, contract services
for maintenance of equipment and facilities, fuel, supplies,
and repair parts for weapons and equipment. Financial
requirements are influenced by many factors, including the
number of aircraft squadrons, divisions, installations,
military strength and deployments, rates of operational
activity, and the quantity and complexity of major equipment
(aircraft, missiles, tank, et cetera) in operation."
* O&MMCR did not become an appropriation until 1973, operation
and maintenance funding for the Reserves prior to 1973 came
under O&MMC.
G. EXPLANATIONS OF TABLES AND FIGURES
All data contained in the tables, except Table 2.1 and 6.1,
was compiled from the individual Budgets of the United States
"Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States
Government , Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office,
FY1994.
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Government (also known as the President's Budget) from fiscal years
1960 to 1994. Out-year data was gathered from the fiscal year 1994
Future Years Defense Program. The graphs were directly derived
from these tables and show individual and cumulative percentage
increases and decreases. Dollar amounts shown represent nominal
figures. Lastly, inflationary increases imply pay raises and price
growth within the Department of Defense, and are not related to the
national consumer price index.
H. EXPLANATION OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE CATEGORIES
Prior to 1967 a Marine Corps reservist was assigned to what
was then called the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR) . The
OMCR was comprised of reservists who were required to attend drill
once a month and complete two weeks of active duty training per
year. The OMCR was very similar to today's Selected Marine Corps
Reserve (SMCR) . Prior to 1967 there was also the Volunteer
Reserve, the equivalent of today's Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
.
These individuals were generally prior service Marines and were not
required to attend monthly drills or required to perform two weeks
of annual training. Figure 2.1 shows all the categories within the
Marine Corps Reserve. A brief explanation of each category is also
provided. For the purpose of this thesis, only the Ready Reserve,
i.e., SMCR/OMCR and the IRR/Volunteer Reserve is relevant.
11
FIGURE 2.1










Source: CNA Study, 1992
READY RESERVE:
SMCR (Selected Marine Corps Reserve) : consists of units and
individuals who participate in weekend drills and two-week
annual training. The SMCR is the main source of trained units
to fill out the structure in time of war.
IRR (Individual Ready Reserve) : consists of individuals who
have served previously in the active forces or SMCR. The IRR
has two main roles: to augment the supporting establishment
(bases, stations, training commands, and major headquarters),
and to provide individual replacements. During an all-out war
or protracted conflict, the IRR would provide a 'band-aid
bridge' until additional replacements could be either recruited
or drafted or trained.
RETIRED RESERVE:
Retirees : retired officers and enlisted personnel with over 30
years of service.
FMCR (Fleet Marine Corps Reserve) : enlisted personnel with
between 20 and 30 years of service.
12
STANDBY RESERVE:
Other reservists liable for active duty only in limited cases,
for example, certain federal employees. 12
I. CONCLUSION:
With the Marine Corps Reserve making huge strides as an
organization from 1916 to the 1950' s, the reserves seemed poised
for the 1960*s. Chapter III explores the role of Marine Corps
Reserve in the 1960's.
12H. Dwight Lyons, USMC Active and Reserve Force Structure and
Mix Study, Vol. II: Summary , Center for Naval Analyses,
Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, p. 14 and 19.
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HI. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1960's
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
Chapter III traces the reorganization of the Marine Corps
Reserve through the 1960's and explores the funding and end
strengths of the reserves relative to the regular Marine Corps.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The 1960's was a decade of turbulance and change in the United
States. With the launching of Sputnik in 1959, the Cold War
intensified. Additionally, the U-2 incident in 1960, the Berlin
Wall crisis in 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, added
more tension to an already bitter relationship between the Soviet
Union and the United States. The Vietnam War was also at the
forefront, proving to be a continuously volatile issue.
Ironically, the Marine Corps Reserve was never mobilized for the
Vietnam War.
During the decade, the Marine Corps Reserve also saw drastic
changes. In July 1962, the Comandant announced the reorganization
of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR) . This reorganization
was the birth of the Fourth Marine Division/Wing team. Colonel
H.S. Wilson, Head, Personnel Management, Division of Reserve in
1967, explains that:
Prior to 1962, the Marine Corps Reserve was an assortment of
drill pay units training individuals who were to be mobilized
to fill vacancies in the regular Marine Corps.... In 1962 the
Marine Corps Reserve was reorganized to contain the elements of
14
Division/Wing Teams — to be mobilized by unit, rather than
individual Marine. 13
Three years later, another reorganization of the OMCR took place.
Major C.W. Sampson of the Plan, Programs and Training Branch,
Division of Reserve, Headquarters Marine Corps comments that:
In late 1965, the Commandant approved a plan to further
reorganize the OMCR along the lines of the active forces. The
Division/Wing team was to become a mirror image of an active
Marine Expeditionary Force. 14
As a result of this reorganization, in December 1967, the Organized
Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR) became the Selected Marine Corps
Reserve (SMCR). 15 In essence, during the 1960's, the nation as
well as the Marine Corps Reserve experienced major changes.
C. ANALYSIS OF DATA
Even though the Marine Corps Reserve experienced
organizational changes, the end strengths remained stable
throughout the 1960's. (See Table 3.1)
Prior to 1966, the end strengths for the active as well as
reserve components remained relatively stable. During those years,
with the exception of 1962, the end strength within RPMC varied
less than two percent. In 1962, the United States found itself on
the brink of war as the Kennedy administration maneuvered its way
13Col. H.S. Wilson, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps Gazette ,
Vol. 51, No. 7, July 1967, p. 12.
14Ma j . C.W. Sampson, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps Gazette
,
Vol. 53, No. 12, December 1969, p. 45.
15H. Dwight Lyons, USMC Active and Reserve Force Structure and
Mix Study. Vol. I: Summary , Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria,
Virginia, 1992, p. 8.
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TABLE 3.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1960 's
Year MPMC % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe RPMC % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe
1960 170,621 0% 0% 46,470 0% 0%
1961 176,909 3.69% 3.69% 45,975 (1.07%) (1..07%)
1962 190,962 7.94% 11.63% 48, 608 5.73% 4,.66%
1963 189,683 (0.67%) 10.96% 48, 102 (1.04%) 3,,62%
1964 189,751 0.04% 11.00% 47,927 (0.36%) 3,.26%
1965 190,187 0.23% 11.22% 48,243 0.66% 3,.92%
1966 261,687 38.00% 48.82% 51,256 6.25% 10,,16%
1967 278,145 6.00% 55.11% 49,788 (2.86%) 7,,30%
1968 307,252 10.00% 65.57% 47,983 (3.63%) 3,.67%
1969 309,771 0.82% 66.39% 49,908 4.00% 7,.68%
Sources: Off ice of Mansigement and Budget, Budqet of the United
States Government , (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1960-1969.
through the Cuban missile crisis. As expected, active component
end strength rose by four and eight percent in 1961 and 1962 in
response to the crisis.
From 1966 on, with the increased involvement of the United
States in the Vietnam War, the end strength in the MPMC
appropriation saw a significant increase. MPMC increased by
thirty-eight percent in 1966, whereas the reserve end strength
increased by a little more than six percent. As the war escalated,
so did the active duty end strength, reaching its peak in 1969.
However, the reserve end strength remained stable, varying no more
than four percent during any given year. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show
the relative stability of the reserves and the increases
experienced by the regular component as a result of the Cuban
missile crisis and the Vietnam War.
16
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Table 3.2 shows the dollars asssociated with these
appropriations. Again, prior to 1966 the funds associated with the
MPMC and RPMC appropriations were relatively stable, with the
exception of 1962. Both MPMC and RPMC in 1962 and 1964 show
approximately six and ten percent increases in funding. These
increases can be attributed to the increase in end strength as a
result of the Cuban missile crisis and the escalating activity in
Vietnam. In 1966, with increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the
funding allocated to both appropriations experienced increases.
TABLE 3.2
Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve) 1960 's
($000)
Year MPMC % Change %Cum Change RPMC % Change %Cum Change
1960 597,962 0% 0% 24,066 0% 0%
1961 602,063 0.69% 0.69% 24,385 1.33% 1.33%
1962 639,330 5.83% 6.88% 25,994 6.60% 7.92%
1963 664,740 3.97% 10.85% 26,662 2.57% 10.49%
1964 725,424 9.13% 19.98% 29,497 10.63% 21.13%
1965 753,392 3.86% 23.83% 30,899 4.75% 25.88%
1966 978,247 29.85% 53.68% 36,133 16.94% 42.82%
1967 1,250,378 27.89% 81.50% 36,933 2.21% 45.03%
1968 1,430,689 14.42% 95.92% 35,875 (2.86%) 42.17%
1969 1,627,084 6.02% 103.19% 36,357 1.34% 43.51%
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government
,
(series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1960-1969.
The dollar increases occurred mainly in the MPMC
appropriation, with RPMC appropriation seeing a noticeable increase
only in 1966. Dollars after 1966 for the RPMC appropriation
remained stable, whereas the the MPMC appropriation experienced
continuous increases after 1966. (See Figure 3.3 and 3.4)
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On the Operation and Maintenance side, a similar pattern
unfolds during the 1960's. (See Table 3.3) Prior to 1966, active
O&M funding experienced increases, but solely as a result of
inflation. O&M funding for reserve training decreased by eight
percent in 1961 but regained most of the decrease the following
year with a seven percent increase in funding. O&M reserve funding
from 1960 to 1965 remained stable. In 1966 the O&MMC appropriation
experienced a 73 percent increase, whereas the O&M funding for
reserve training only increased by seven percent.
In summary, the active component experienced significant
increases in funding for O&M as a result of increased involvement
in the Vietnam War. That trend continued until 1969, after which
funding declined. (See Figures 3.5 and 3.6) On the reserve side,
TABLE 3.3
Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1960's
($000)
Year O&MMC % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe O&MMCR % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe
1960 165,041 0% 0% 4,647 0% 0%
1961 171, 161 3.71% 3.71% 4,262 (8.28%) (8.28%)
1962 181,093 5.80% 9.51% 4,565 7.11% (1.18%)
1963 182,592 0.83% 10.34% 4, 550 (0.33%) (1.50%)
1964 185,088 1.33% 11.71% 4,802 5.54% 4.03%
1965 189,225 2.24% 13.94% 4,769 (0.69%) 3.35%
1966 327,479 73.06% 87.00% 5,097 6.88% 10.22%
1967 423,298 29.26% 116.26% 5,856 14.89% 25.12%
1968 427,322 0.95% 117.21% 6, 637 13.34% 38.45%
1969 452,751 5.95% 123. 17% 5,999 (9.61%) 28.84%
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budqet of the United
States; Government, (series), Washinqton, D .C. , U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1960-1969
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the O&M funding remained relatively stable, with the exception of
1967 and 1968, which can be attributed to increased funding for
maintenance of reserve facilities. BGen. J.L. Stewart,
Director, Marine Corps Reserve in 1965 explains:
There are 46 more new structures planned during the next five
years. We have been able to obtain one and half million
dollars a year for new construction. We must make every dollar
count since improvements and such essential items as larger
storage areas must be funded from this total. By careful
management we have been able to build about four or centers
annually. 16
D. CONCLUSION
Considering the role/mission of the Marine Corps Reserve
during the 1960's, the end strengths and the corresponding dollars
paint a very clear picture. Because of the reorganization of the
Marine Corps Reserve and its lack of involvement in Vietnam, the
funding and end strengths remained relatively stable, with slight
increases occuring from 1966-1968. Because of the limited
involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, the Marine
Corps Reserve was not mobilized as was the case in World War II and
the Korean War. Therefore the 1960's show the Marine Corps Reserve
appropriations remaining relatively stable, whereas the active
component appropriations experienced significant increases.
16BGen. J.L. Stewart, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps Gazette ,
Vol. 49, No. 9, September 1965, p. 10.
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IV. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1970's
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
Chapter IV explores the Marine Corps Reserve in the 1970's.
Of particular concern is the post Vietnam era, the
origin/ implementation of the Total Force Policy and the turbulance
in end strength and funding experienced by the Marine Corps Reserve
during the 1970's.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
If the 1960 's can be described as a decade of social unrest
and change, the 1970's can be described as the decade in the which
the United States recuperates and grows accustomed to changes that
occurred during the 1960 's. The Vietnam war was the impetus for a
lot of the growing pains the United States experienced in the
1970's. The Nixon Administration came into office on the promise
that it would end the war and bring peace back to the United
States. Because the war had been so unpopular, we saw the draft
give way to an All-Volunteer Force and military end strength and
funding take considerable reductions.
Aside from the social ramifications resulting from the
Vietnam War, economic concerns also prevailed. The high cost of
waging war in Vietnam and the effects of the Johnson
Administration's war on poverty were starting to affect the
economy. Also as a result of the OPEC oil embargo, the
United States for the first time experienced inflation and
unemployment simultaneously, i.e., stagflation. But probably
23
the most significant policy/concept to affect the military in the
1970' s was the Total Force concept.
The Total Force concept was established by then Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird in August 1970. The thrust behind this
concept was to find more efficient ways of allocating scarce
resources within the Department of Defense. One way to reduce
costs and still maintain a sizeable military force, was to put more
emphasis on the reserves. The memorandum orginally drafted by
Secretary Laird emphasized the following:
Within the Department of Defense, these economies will reguire
reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active
forces, and increased reliance on the combat support units of
the Guard and Reserves.... Emphasis will be given to current
considerations of the total forces, active and reserve, to
determine the most advantageous mix to support national
strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be
applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning,
eguipping and employing the Guard and Reserve force. 17
The Laird memorandum attempted to show Congress that the Department
of Defense intended to cut the Pentagon Budget. By emphasizing the
less expensive reserve forces over the active duty forces, a clear
message was being given that cost reduction measures were about to
be implemented.
Even though the Total Force Concept was initially born in
1970, it did not become official policy until 1973 under then
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Schlesinger stated that:
...the Total Force is no longer a 'concept'. It is now the
Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and
Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.... It must be clearly
17Patrick M. Cronin, The Total Force Policy in Historical
Perspective , Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, 1987,
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understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy, as
emphasized by Presidential and National Security Council
documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense policy, is the
fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the
initial and primary augmentation of the active forces. 18
C. ANALYSIS OF DATA
Ironically, even though the Total Force went from a concept to
official policy, the Marine Corps Reserve continued to decline.
Correspondingly, active duty end strength experienced significant
decreases between 1970 and 1974. (See Table 4.1)
TABLE 4.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1970 's
Year MPMC % Chanqe %Cum Charioe RPMC % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe
1970 259,737 0% 0% 48,575 0% 0%
1971 212,369 (18.24%) (18.24% ) 47,761 (1.68%) (1.68%)
1972 198,238 (6.65%) (24.89% I 41,484 (13.14%) (14.82%)
1973 196,098 (1.08%) (25.97% I 38,196 (7.93%) (22.74%)
1974 188,802 (3.72%) (29.69% I 31,896 (16.49%) (39.24%)
1975 195,951 3.79% (25.90% I 33,089 3.74% (35.50%)
1976 192,336 (1.84%) (27.75%, | 26,849 (18.86%) (54.36%)
1977 191,641 (0.36%) (28.11%, | 31,687 18.02% (36.34%)
1978 190,755 (0.46%) (28.57%, | 33,403 5.42% (30.92%)
1979 185,187 (2.92%) (31.49% | 34,280 2.63% (28.30%)
Sources: Off ice of Maneigement aiid Budget, Budqet of the United
States Government, (series) , Washington, D .C, U.S. Government
Print ing Office, 1970-1979.
Obviously with the United States pulling out of Vietnam, the active
Marine Corps saw its end strength decrease, especially in 1971,
when it experienced an eighteen percent decrease. Between 1970 and
1974, the Marine Corps Reserve end strength reductions, with the
exception of 1971, were greater than the active duty reductions.
18Ibid. 9.
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A possible explanation would be that a lot of individuals
looking for ways to avoid serving in Vietnam used the reserves as
a haven for avoiding service in Vietnam. As the Vietnam war ended,
there was an exodus from the reserves. Additionally, with the All-
Volunteer-Force becoming a reality in 1973 and a lot of anti-
military sentiment existing because of the war, the military found
it hard to attract individuals to its ranks. Lastly, even though
the Total Force Policy was enacted, in practice the Pentagon had
shown little effort in augmenting its reserve forces. Figures 4.1
and 4.2 show the end strength decreases experienced by the Marine
Corps (active and reserve) between 1970 and 1974. It becomes quite
obvious that the Total Force Policy remained essentially hollow in
the early 1970' s, and a strong emphasis was not put on the reserves
until the late 1970's.
a
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Another reason for the Total Force Policy remaining
essentially hollow in the early 1970' s, was that Pentagon officials
believed in a defense strategy which was geared toward a nuclear
war. A nuclear war would for all intent and purposes be quick and
would not allow for the mobilization of reserve forces. Not until
the late 1970 's, after realizing that the Soviets had reached
nuclear parity with the United States, and the event of a nuclear
war would destroy both sides, did the strategy change from one of
a nuclear confrontation to a conventional one. In the minds of
military planners, a conventional war between the United States and
Soviet Union would be a long drawn out affair most likely fought
on European soil. Such a scenario would definitely favor the
deployment/mobilization of reserve forces because enough time would
be available to mobilize and train reservists.
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The data in Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2 reflect this
change in strategy. In the late 1970' s, one sees a steady increase
in the Marine Corps Reserve ranging from three to eighteen percent.
On the active duty side, end strength remained relatively stable,
experiencing minimal decreases ranging from zero to three percent.
The Department of Defense's inconsistent actions concerning
the reserves during the 1970 's is very evident in the funding for
the Marine Corps Reserve, i.e., personnel and operation and
maintenance. Table 4.2 shows RPMC funding increasing every year
except in 1974. Fiscal years 1973 to 1974 show erratic funding
TABLE 4.2
Marine Corps Personnel Fundinq (Active and Reserve] 1 1970's
($000)
Year MPMC % Chanqe % Cum Chanqe RPMC % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe
1970 1,627,084 0% 0% 48,847 0% 0%
1971 1,461,640 (10. 17%) (10. 17%) 53,672 9.88% 9.88%
1972 1,455,792 (0.40%) (10.57%) 58,144 8.33% 18.21%
1973 1,577,722 8. 38% (2. 19%) 68,375 17.60% 35.81%
1974 1,660,636 5.26% 3.06% 60,490 (11.53%) 24.27%
1975 1,745,766 5.17% 8.19% 65,122 7.66% 31.93%
1976 1,851,277 6.04% 14.23% 70,967 8.98% 40.91%
1977 1,900,124 2.64% 16.87% 73,697 4.23% 45.13%
1978 2,013,704 5.98% 22.85% 82, 196 11.13% 56.26%
1979 2, 098,462 4.21% 27.06% 83,903 2.08% 58.34%
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budqet of the United
States Government , (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970-1979.
in which funding increased by eighteen percent and decreased by
twelve percent the following year. The 1973 increase was a result
of increased emphasis on training and support, whereas the 1974
decrease reflected the sixteen percent decrease in end strength.
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From 1975 to 1979 funding was consistently increased by as little
as two percent to as much as eleven percent.
The MPMC appropriation remained very consistent during the
1970' s. Aside from the draw-down as a result of the Vietnam war,
1970-1972, the MPMC appropriation remained very stable from 1973 to
1979. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show MPMC and RPMC funding.
The Operation and Maintenance appropriation for the reserves
shows the same irregularity. From 1970 to 1975 we see sharp
increases interrupted by decreases. Not until the late seventies
do we see significant, continous increases in the Operations
and Maintenance funding for the reserves. (See Table 4.3)
TABLE 4.3
Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1970 's
($000)
Year O&MMC % Change %Cum Change O&MMCR % Change %Cum Change
1970 400,219 0% 0% 6,395 0% 0%
1971 394,727 (1.37%) (1.37%) 8,601 34.50% 34.50%
1972 353,191 (10.52%) (9.64%) 8,094 (5.89%) 28.60%
1973 383,139 8.48% 3.83% 7,945 (1.84%) 26.76%
1974 441,540 15.24% 11.41% 12,094 52.22% 78.98%
1975 458,869 3.92% 15.34% 11,611 (3.99%) 74.99%
1976 512,203 11.62% 26.96% 11,739 1.10% 76.09%
1977 591,313 15.45% 42.41% 15,008 27.85% 103.94%
1978 657,517 11.20% 53.60% 16,257 8.32% 112.26%
1979 745,082 13.32% 60.62% 19,660 20.93% 133.19%
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government , (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970-1979.
Operation and Maintenance funding for the active force, again aside
from the Vietnam draw-down, remained very consistent during the
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D. CONCLUSION
The 1970' s proved to be a decade in which the Marine Corps
Reserve found itself in a state of flux. Although the Total Force
Concept/Policy put more emphasis on the reserves, largely because
of the prevailing military strategy, the reserves never really
received the increases in end strength and funding as envisioned by
the Total Force Policy. Not until the mid to late 1970 's, in which
a conventional war scenario became a reality, did the reserves
receive the attention that had been espoused by the Total Force
Policy of the 1973. That increased emphasis on the reserves would
continue through the 1980 's.
32
V. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1980's
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Marine Corps
Reserve during the 1980's. This chapter will emphasize the
implementation of the Total Force Policy under the Reagan
Administration and the budget constraints experienced by military
planners because of increasing budget deficits.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Ever since the United States military strategy changed in the
mid-1970 's from a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union to a
conventional scenario, the Total Force Policy became more than just
a formulated strategy, it became reality. In the late 1970' s the
Marine Corps Reserve started to expand, but not until the Reagan
Administration took office in 1981, was the Total Force Policy
fully implemented.
Ronald Reagan came into office promising to make America
strong again. The logic behind the strategy was that a strong
America would be much more adept at dealing with the containment of
communism than a weak one. With the Soviet Union flexing its
military muscle in Afghanistan, United States policy makers had
plenty to be concerned about. Relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union were so soured that the United States
boycotted the 1980 Olympics. As Ronald Reagan took office, one of
his main objectives was to increase military spending using the
Total Force Policy as a guide.
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Although the Total Force Policy was only paid lip-service
during the 1970' s, Ronald Reagan knew that he could out-spend the
Soviets militarily. The Soviet Union, a superpower in her own
right, was economically a third world country. Forcing the Soviets
to direct an increasing share of their GNP to defense would
eventually derail their economy. Therefore the United States could
increase its military spending, retain its economic heavyweight
status, and maintain pressure on the Soviets.
The Secretary of the Navy for Ronald Reagan was John Lehman.
Secretary Lehman was intent on restoring the Navy to a 600 ship
Navy. As early as 1975, RADM Staser Holcomb testified before
Congress on the decline of the U.S. Navy:
By capitalizing on the large inventory of ships built during
WW II, the Congress was able to maintain an active fleet of 800
to 900 ships... peaking at 976 in 1968.... During the past 10
years, an average of 19 new ships has been authorized for
construction each year. . . procurement sufficient to maintain an
active fleet of about 510 ships, under steady state conditions
and nominal ship life assumptions. Today, most of our World
War II ships have been retired and we have, in fact, a 500-ship
active fleet. 19
RADM Holcomb envisioned a 600-ship Navy by the mid-1980 s. 20
In essence, Secretary Lehman used the 600 ship mark as a guide to
rebuild a Navy that had been neglected throughout the 1970' s.
This emphasis on making America strong again also affected the
Marine Corps. As with the Navy, the 1970 J s had been a difficult
decade for the Marine Corps and the 1980' s would prove to be a
19Cronin, Total Force , p. 38.
20Ibid., p. 38.
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rebuilding period. Robert J. Murray, former Under Secretary of the
Navy explains:
The atmosphere in the 1980 's is certainly better than the
atmosphere was in the 1970' s. The American people now see that
the Navy's mission and the Marine Corps' mission are important,
that American responsibility around the world is still going to
continue in the 1980 's, that the Navy and the Marine Corps are
the services that have to cover the bulk of those global
responsibilities, and that we cannot put armies and air forces
on other people's territory except in very special cases like
Germany, Korea, and the United Kingdom.... 21
With an emphasis on increasing Naval and Marine Corps forces, the
Total Force Policy would reguire policy makers to also put an
emphasis on the reserves. Since John Lehman was a reserve naval
aviator himself, the Total Force Policy was definitely allowed to
flourish and the reserve components of both the Navy and Marine
Corps saw personnel as well as funding increases during the 1980 's.
The mere fact that Secretary Lehman was a reservist was not
the only reason for an increased emphasis on the reserves. The
main reason for the resurgence of the reserves in the Navy and
Marine Corps was because they were cheaper. Even though the Reagan
Administration wanted to increase the military both in equipment
and manpower, Congress was hesistant about this escalation because
of increasing manpower costs. One way to reduce manpower costs was
to follow the original intent of the Total Force Policy and put
more emphasis on the reserves. The policy as well as the reserves
came in handy since military strategists had envisioned a
conventional war scenario in which enough response time was
available to mobilize and deploy reservists. Also, as evidenced by
2ICronin, Total Force , p. 39.
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings I and II, during the 1980' s, Congress was
increasingly becoming worried about the growing budget deficit.
As the Total Force Policy was implemented, the roles and
missions of the Marine Corps Reserve were again redefined. The
following provides the thrust of the roles and missions of the
Marine Corps Reserve during the early 1980' s:
The mission of the Reserve is to provide additional capability
and depth for sustained operations during lengthy deployments
or protracted combat.
* Augmentation , which is filling existing structure. For




which is adding capabilities to active
Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTF's). For example,
a MAGTF may be reinforced by a reserve artillery battalion.
* Reconstitution (formerly called force expansion), which is
providing additional forces. It should be noted that
existing reserve units expect to fill the augmentation and
reinforcement roles. Reconstitution would likely involve
building additional reserve units around nondeployed SMCR
command structure (e.g., division headquarters). 22
As a result, the Marine Corps Reserve was structured along the
same lines as the active component to reflect a "mirror image." In
theory, the Marine Corps Reserve should be able to perform the same
functions as the active component.
Although the United States found itself involved in relatively
small military conflicts during the 1980's, i.e., Grenada, the
bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, the bombing of Libya,
the Marine Corps Reserve was again relegated to the role of having
22Lyons, Reserve Mix Study, Vol. II
, p. 9-10
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to wait. The benefits of the build-up of the Marine Corps Reserve
would not be realized until the next decade in Desert Storm/Shield.
C. ANALYSIS OF DATA
The early 1980 's saw a tremendous build-up of the United
States armed forces, whereas the late 1980 's show small incremental
decreases in both personnel and funding.
The Marine Corps end strength, active and reserve, reflect
this scenario. The active component remained very stable
throughout the 1980' s. MPMC experienced steady one percent end
strength increases from 1980-1987. From 1988-1989, the MPMC end
strength decreased by no more than one percent. In essence, the
active component shows a very steady increase in end strength
throughout the 1980' s, marked by minimal decreases in 1988 and
1989. This is very much in line with the policies of the
administrations that were in office during the 1980' s. The Reagan
administration increased military end strength and funding, whereas
the Bush administration in the late 1980' s started decreasing
military expenditures.
The Marine Corps Reserve reflects a similar scenario, but is
definitely not as stable as the active component. As expected with
the implementation of the Total Force Policy under the Reagan
Administration in 1981, the reserves saw significant increases in
end strength during the early 1980' s. In 1982 and 1983, end
strength increased by nine percent and six percent respectively.
The six percent increase in 1983 was subsequently offset by a five
37
percent decrease the following year, 1984. From the 1985 to 1989,
reserve end strength either remained the same or increased.
In summary, the end strength for the Marine Corps Reserve
during the 1980' s can be described in three phases; build-up,
transistion period, build-up. The early 1980' s show a build-up of
reserve end strength, whereas the mid-1980 1 s shows a transition
period which is marked by small increases and decreases. The late
1980' s show the Marine Corps Reserve growing again.
Even though the active component end strengths are much more
stable, one can definitely see that an emphasis had been put on the
reserves. Table 5.1 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 paint an even clearer
picture.
TABLE 5.1













States Government , (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980-1989.
% Chanqe %Cum Chanqe RPMC % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe
0% 0% 37, 038 0% 0%
1. 14% 1. 14% 37, 049 0. 03% 0. 03%
0.75% 1.90% 40,461 9.21% 9.24%
1.07% 2.95% 38, 196 5.51% 14.75%
1.08% 4.04% 31,896 (4.85%) 9.90%
0.94% 4.97% 33, 089 2.38% 12.28%
0.40% 5.37% 26,849 (0.01%) 12.27%
0. 36% 5.73% 31, 687 1.61% 13.88%
(1.09%) 4.64% 33,403 3.08% 16.97%
(0.91%) 3.73% 34,280 0.05% 17.01%
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Funding associated with these end strengths show a similar
pattern, but not the same. The early 1980's (1981-1983)
show increased funding for both the actives and the reserves.
Even though MPMC experienced increases in 1981 and 1982, RPMC
received even bigger percentage increases. In 1981 and 1982, the
RPMC appropriation increased by twenty-four percent and twenty-
seven percent respectively. One can definitely see that the Reagan
administration was keeping its promise of increased funding for the
military in the early 1980's.
The rest of the decade remained stable, except for 1985. In
1985 MPMC experienced a forty-one percent increase and RPMC an
fifty-seven percent increase. The reason for these tremendous
increases was the establishment of accrual accounting for the
military retirement system. 23 In essence, the retired pay for the
Marine Corps was now included in the MPMC and RPMC appropriations.
If the change in the allocation of retired pay had not occurred,
funding increases for both appropriations after 1984 would have
remained very steady. Between 1984 and 1989, excluding 1985, MPMC
basically experienced inflationary increases. For RPMC the same
logic applies, with the exception of 1987, where RPMC experiences
a slight decrease of two percent. (See Table 5.2 and Figures 5.3
and 5.4)
"United States Marine Corps, Reserve Personnel Marine Corps
Budget. Fiscal Year 1985 , Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 26.
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TABLE 5.2
Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve)
($000)
1980's
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Summing up the 1980' s for personnel funding, with the
exception of 1985, funding increased in the early 1980' s as a
result of the Reagan build-up. After 1985, both appropriations
experienced minimal increases and decreases.
Operation and Maintenance for both the active and reserve
component followed a very similar path during the 1980' s. Again,
the early 1980 *s show significant increases in both appropriations.
O&MMCR received thirty-five, thirty-nine, and twenty-seven percent
increases from 1981 to 1983 respectively. O&MMC received similar
increases in funding but not as dramatic as O&MMCR. After 1984 we
see both appropriations following a similar pattern marked
by increases and decreases. In 1986 O&MMC was cut five percent
and O&MMCR took a corresponding seven percent decrease.
These reductions where most likely in response to the
42
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation on deficit reduction. The
following year, 1987, both appropriations experienced sizeable
increases, seventeen percent for O&MMC and eighteen percent for
O&MMCR, to regain the losses incurred the previous year. Again,
Table 5.3 shows the raw data and percentage increases and
decreases. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show how both appropriations
followed almost the same path during the 1980' s.
TABLE 5.3
Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1980 's
($000)
Year O&MMC % Change %Cum Change O&MMCR % Change %Cum Change
1980 880,167 0% 0% 21,155 0% 0%
1981 1,089,839 23.82% 23.82% 28,594 35.16% 35.16%
1982 1,181,103 8.37% 32.20% 39,762 39.06% 74.22%
1983 1,479,412 25.26% 57.45% 50,453 26.89% 101.11%
1984 1,559,971 5.45% 62.90% 52,111 3.29% 104.40%
1985 1,657,778 6.27% 69.17% 58,669 12.58% 116.98%
1986 1,575,629 (4.93%) 64.21% 54,357 (7.35%) 109.63%
1987 1,841,427 16.87% 81.08% 63,978 17.70% 127.33%
1988 1,800,488 (2.22%) 78.86% 69,500 8.63% 135.96%
1989 1,839,947 2.19% 81.05% 77,417 11.39% 147.35%
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government
,
(series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980-1989.
D. CONCLUSION
The 1980' s can be described as a decade in which the military
saw a resurgence. President Reagan's campaign promise to make
America strong again resulted in the increased funneling of
resources to the military. The Marine Corps, active and reserve
component, both benefited from the increased emphasis on the
military. The big difference in this build-up was that this time
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the reserves were included. End Strength and the corresponding
funding for personnel and operations and maintenance show
significant increases during the early 1980' s. Without question,
the Total Force Policy was very instrumental in guiding this build-
up. After 1984, end strengths and funding drop off
significantly. With the national deficit becoming much more of an
issue during the later part of the 1980' s, fiscal conservatives
sought to put more emphasis on reducing the deficit. Also, with
the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev, and his policies of Glasnost
and Perestroika, the once omninous threat from the Soviet Union
seemed to be waning. This change in the threat and the decline of
the Warsaw Pact powers would prove significant for the 1990' s.
45
VI. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1990's
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the role of the
Marine Corps Reserve in the post Cold War era. Addressed will be
the Base Force concept implemented under the Bush Administration,
as well as the Bottom-Up review proposed by the Clinton
Administration. Also, a brief explanation of the Marine Corps
Reserve's involvement in Desert Storm/Shield will be given. The
analysis of the budget data will show actual data through fiscal
year 1993, and data from fiscal years 1994 to 1999 are projected
end strengths and funding from the latest Future Years Defense
Program.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The threat of communism was the impetus for American foreign
policy for forty years. In this era, ethnic, national, religious
and economic conflicts, whether in the Persian Gulf, the former
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or Somalia, dominated the scene. Since
the late 1980' s, the world has changed from a bipolar world to a
multipolar world with a lot more complexity.
The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union has left the
United States as the only superpower in the world. This new status
has resulted in the United States having to rethink and reshape its
military forces to handle the post Cold War threats.
The collapse of the Soviet Union came in two phases. The
first phase began when Mikhail Gorbachev announced to the United
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Nations in December 1988, that he would withdraw Soviet troops from
Eastern Europe and reduce Soviet forces. That phase ended with the
fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, signaling the end of the
Warsaw Pact and also the end of the Soviet Union's domination of
Eastern Europe.
This turn of events resulted in the United States scaling back
its forces in light of the reduced threat from the Soviet Union.
This reduction came in the form of the Base Force concept,
introduced by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and announced by
President Bush in August of 1990. The purpose of the Base Force
concept was to reduce the United States military by twenty-five
percent from 1990 to 1995. The Base Force was basically a
downsized force shaped largely by Cold War priorities.
The second phase of the collapse of the Soviet Union came in
the summer of 1991, when hardliners attempted to overthrow Mikhail
Gorbachev to halt the social and economic changes sweeping the
Soviet Union. This attempt not only failed, but accelerated change
within the Soviet Union and ultimately led to the formation of the
new Commonwealth of Independent States and the emergence of Boris
Yeltsin.
This change in the world has significantly impacted the Marine
Corps. Marine Corps active end strength was projected to decrease
from 196,652 in fiscal year 1990 to 158,800 in fiscal year 1997.
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The reserves were to take a similar reduction in end strength from
44,530 in fiscal year 1990 to 34,900 in fiscal year 1997. 24
Ironically on the day President Bush announced the Base Force
concept, Iraq invaded Kuwait. As a result, some thought the Base
Force concept was premature because Saddam Hussein had shown that
the world was still a dangerous place. Others, because of the
quick and decisive victory of the United States and the coalition
forces in the war that followed, wanted to reduce the Base Force
even more.
Nevertheless, the liberation of Kuwait by the coalition forces
provided an opportunity for the reserves from all the services of
the United States to employ their skills and training. Operation
Desert Storm/Shield for first time since the Korean war saw the
Marine Corps Reserve mobilized. Although the Marine Corps was
authorized to call up the reserve component, there was a delay.
H. Dwight Lyons explains:
Although authorized to do so, the Marines did not immediately
start calling up reserves. On 23 August, the Commandant issued
a message stating, in effect, that active forces would be used
for the first 60 days of the contingency, but reserve units
should 'stand by' to be called up after that time. There has
been some discussion of whether it was Marine Corps 'policy'
not to call reserves for the first 60 days. A review of
mobilization policy failed to produce any references to a 60-
day policy. We believe the Commandant was proving a point —
that Marines, as a 'force in readiness,' could respond to
regional contingencies for the first 60 days without reserve
support. 25
24National Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure
and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the
Secretary of Defense , RAND MDA903-90-C-0004 , 1992, p. 8.
25Lyons, Reserve Mix Study, Vol. II
, p. 20.
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Additionally, Marygail Brauner, Harry Thie, and Roger Brown, in a
RAND study titled, Assessing the Structure Mix of Future Active and
Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the
Persian Gulf Conflict , observed the following:
Marine Corps policy during Operation Desert Storm/Shield was
that no reserve units would be used for the first 60 days. The
active-duty Marines, in theory, should be able to initially
respond to any contingency. Furthermore, USMCR personnel were
to be activated only when the active component had been fully
committed. By November 6, the Washington Times was reporting
that the Marine Corps would be activating reservists for combat
missions. It was evident that the combat units of the active-
duty Marines were extended worldwide as much as possible and
that they would need augmentation from the reserves. 26
Once called to active duty, the reserves did an outstanding
job. Their achievements in Operation Desert Storm/Shield are
documented by LtCol. Mark F. Cancian, who in Marine Corps Reserve
Forces in Southwest Asia explains:
An active duty commander summed it up, 'When the dust settles,
the performance of Marine Corps reserves in Desert Shield and
Desert Storm will have to be considered a very, very big
success. We were able to take reserve combat units, combat
support units and combat service support units, mobilize them,
deploy them and employ them in a war and they did fine. ' The
basic structures, policies and for Marine Corps reserve forces
are, therefore, sound. 27 [sic]
In essence, for the first time the Total Force Policy was put to
the test, and the planning and expenditures devoted to the building
of the integrated network between active and reserve forces proved
26Marygail Brauner, Harry Thie, and Roger Brown, Assessing the
Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces:
Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the Persian Gulf War ,
RAND, MR-132-OSD, 1992, p. 40.
27LtCol. Mark F. Cancian, Marine Corps Reserve Forces in
Southwest Asia , Marine Corps Research Center, Research Paper
92-0015, July 1991, p. 9.
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to be worthwhile. But the rest of the 1990' s will probably show a
shift away from employment of reserve forces.
As mentioned earlier, under the Bush Administration, the Base
Force concept showed drastic reductions in Marine Corps end
strength and funding. Under the Clinton Adminstration, the Base
Force concept has given way to the Bottom-Up review.
As the Clinton Administration came into office in January of
1993, with the motto that it was time for "change" in America, the
Department of Defense also experienced change. With volatile
issues such as women in combat, homosexuals in the military, and
the "tailhook" affair, which brought the issue of sexual harassment
to the forefront, the Department of Defense and the administration
found themselves with plenty to be concerned with.
Another result of this "change" sweeping America was that
Department of Defense planners were again reevaluating the national
security threat and the forces necessary to protect against this
threat. The result of this reevaluation was the Bottom-Up review.
Robert Williams writes the following about the Bottom-Up review:
Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Army General Colin Powell,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the review proposes
a total uniformed force of 1.4 million by 1999, which is about
200,000 troops less than was recommended by the Bush
administration. While detailed costs and savings were not
specified in the Bottom-Up review, it is believed that Defense
Department spending would drop nearly $130 billion below the
estimate put forth by the Bush administration through Fiscal
Year 1998.... The package of proposals envisions a largely
U.S. - based force of sufficient size to handle two major
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regional conflicts at the same time. Mentioned as possible
battle sites for the 1990 's are the Middle East and Korea. 28
Actually the Marine Corps fared rather well in the Bottom-Up
review. Table 6.1 shows the differences. Because the Marine
TABLE 6.1
Marine Corps Projected End Strength
(Active and Reserve)
Base Force Concept Bottom-Up Review Change
FY1997 FY1997
Active 158,800 174,000 +14,200
Reserve 34,900 42,000 +7,100
Sources: National Defense Research Institute Study, Assessing the
Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final
Report to the Secretary of Defense , and Bottom-Up review
Corps benefited from the Bottom-Up review, the reductions required
to achieve a force size of 1.4 million by fiscal year 1999 came
from the Army and the Air Force.
C. ANALYSIS OF DATA
Marine Corps end strength and funding data for the 1990' s are
straight forward. As envisioned by the Base Force concept, active
duty end strength saw gradual decreases from fiscal year 1990 to
fiscal year 1993. From fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 1999, as
per the Bottom-Up review, we see active duty end strength coming
down to the projected figure of 174,000.
28Robert Williams, "Aspin's Bottom-Up Review Portends
Significant Cuts," National Defense , Vol. LXXVIII, No. 491,
October 1993, p. 13-14.
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A similar pattern emerges for the reserves. Gradual decreases
occur from fiscal year 1990 to 1993, and as per the Bottom-Up
review, end strength levels out at 42,000 from fiscal year
1994-1999. Table 6.2 shows the percentage increases and decreases
for each fiscal year. Also, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that relative
to the active component, reserve end strength has fared better.
TABLE 6.2









































































































Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government
,
(series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1990-1993, and FY1994 Future Year Defense Program .
Personnel funding again shows the same pattern. The early
1990' s are marked by decreases, with the exception of fiscal year
1991. During fiscal year 1991 the Marine Corps was involved in
Operation Desert Storm/Shield. Because of the mobilization of the
reserves, all pay and allowances for the reserves had to come from
MPMC because they were now part of the active force.
Correspondingly, RPMC took a $52 million funding cut because the
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involvement in Operation Desert Storm/ Shield. 29 During fiscal
years 1994-1999, both MPMC and RPMC experience only minor
increases. (See Table 6.3 and Figures 6.3 and 6.4)
TABLE 6.3
Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve) 1990 's
($000)
Year MPMC % Change %Cum Change RPMC % Change %Cum Change
1990 5,798,822 0% 0% 314,383 0% 0%
1991 6,374,780 9.93% 9.93% 285,685 (9.13%) (9.13%)
1992 6,102,580 (4.27%) 5.66% 345,007 20.76% 11.64%
1993 5,980,998 (1.99%) 3.67% 347,103 0.61% 12.24%
1994 5,678,700 (5.05%) (1.38%) 350,569 1.00% 13.24%
1995 5,686,490 0.14% (1.25%) 343,843 (1.92%) 11.32%
1996 5,774,964 1.56% 0.31% 350,936 2.06% 13.39%
1997 5,831,611 0.98% 1.29% 355,924 1.42% 14.81%
1998 5,962,734 1.73% 3.02% 364,077 2.29% 17.10%
1999 6,062,098 1.67% 4.70% 371,212 1.96% 19.06%
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government , (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1990-1993, and FY1994 Future Year Defense Program .
Operation and Maintenance funding for the active and reserve
components are pretty much the same as MPMC and RPMC. The early
1990' s show decreases, with the exception of fiscal year 1991.
Again the irregularity caused by fiscal year 1991 is because of
Operation Desert Storm/Shield. During fiscal years 1994-1999 we
see steady uneventful inflationary increases. (See Table 6.4 and
Figures 6.5 and 6.6)
^Estimated expenditures - Actual expenditures:
($338 million - $286 million) = $52 million.
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TABLE 6.4
Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1990 's
($000)
Year O&MMC % Chanqe %Cum Chanqe O&MMCR o,o Chanqe %Cum Chanqe
1990 1,850,507 0% 0% 78,382 0% 0%
1991 3,225,182 74.29% 74.29% 84,696 8.06% 8.06%
1992 2,146,464 (33.45%) 40.84% 92,833 9.61% 17.66%
1993 1,976,330 (7.93%) 32.91% 80,035 (13.79%) 3.88%
1994 1,818,000 (8.01%) 24.90% 75, 100 (6.17%) (2.29%)
1995 1,745,146 (4.01%) 20.89% 78,518 4.55% 2.26%
1996 1,893,768 8.52% 29.41% 80,480 2.50% 4.76%
1997 1,988,799 5.02% 34.43% 82,331 2.30% 7.06%
1998 2,035,417 2.34% 36.77% 84,225 2.30% 9.36%
1999 2,137, 167 5.00% 41.77% 86,163 2.30% 11.66%
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budqet of th e United
States Governmerit, (series.) , Washington, D .C . , U.S. Government
Printing Office. 1990-1993, and FY1994 Future Year Defense Proqram.
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The United States finds itself as the only superpower in the
world. With Soviet Union no longer representing the menacing
threat that it used to, the United States has reshaped its military
to meet other contingencies. Those contingencies will probably
entail small regional conflicts which will not require huge
military forces. The data presented, as it pertains to the Marine
Corps, reflects this strategy. This new strategy shows the Marine
Corps becoming smaller relative to the 1980' s and its reserve force
remaining at an end strength of 42,000 ready to augment, reinforce,
reconstitute the active component.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
Now that all the data has been analyzed, this chapter will try
to make sense of the relationship between the active and reserve
components of the Marine Corps. Also addressed will be the future
of the Marine Corps Reserve.
B. ANALYSIS OF DATA (Decade Comparison)
The percentage increases and decreases for the active and
reserve end strengths followed the same pattern in the early
1960's. As the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war increased, so
did the active duty end strength, whereas the reserve end strength
remained stable. Throughout the rest of the 1960's, reserve end
strength again remained stable largely because they were not
mobilized during the Vietnam conflict.
The early 1970's show dramatic decreases in active and reserve
end strengths. These decreases were to be expected as the Vietnam
war came to a close. But after these initial end strength
decreases, the active duty end strength remained stable, whereas
the reserve end strength remained in a continous state of flux.
With the implementation of the Total Force Policy in the early
1970's, the reserves were expected to receive greater emphasis, but
not until the late 1970's did reserve end strength increase.
The 1980 's show stable end strengths for the active component.
With the Reagan Administration's emphasis on rebuilding the
military and the Total Force Policy serving as a guide, the active
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component saw initial increases in the early 1980 's, but the late
1980' s show small decreases in end strength largely as a result of
the turn of events in the Soviet Union.
The reserve component end strengths also show steady increases
throughout the 1980 's. This can be attributed to the Total Force
Policy which emphasized greater dependence on the reserve forces.
The 1990' s show decreases in end strength for both the active
and reserve components. With the Soviet Union no longer considered
the formidable foe of the past, military strategy has yielded to
the Bush Administration's Base Force concept and most recently to
the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up review. (See Table 7.1 and
Figures 7.1 and 7.2)
Personnel funding for the active and reserve components show
interesting patterns from 1960 to 1999. The 1960 's show active and
reserve funding percentage increases and decreases following the
same pattern, with the exception of the Vietnam war.
The 1970 's again show active and reserve personnel funding
experiencing similar percentage increases and decreases, with the
exception of the early 1970 's, where both the MPMC and RPMC
appropriations experienced the post Vietnam draw down.
The 1980 's show significant increases in the MPMC and RPMC
appropriations. Again these increases were the result of the
Reagan build-up, with the RPMC appropriation showing continously
larger percentage increases than the MPMC appropriation.
The 1990' s show both appropriations as very stable. As
expected with the decline of the Soviet Union, funding levels
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TABLE 7.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1960-1999
Year MPMC Change %Cum Change RPMC Change %Cum Change
1960 170 ,621 0% 0% 46 ,470 0% 0%
1961 176 ,909 3 .69% 3 .69% 45 ,975 (1 07%) (1.07%)
1962 190 ,962 7 .94% 11 .63% 48 ,608 5 73% 4.66%
1963 189 ,683 (0 .67% 1 10 .96% 48 ,102 (1 04%) 3.62%
1964 189 ,751 .04% 11 .00% 47 ,927 (0 36%) 3.26%
1965 190 ,187 .23% 11 .22% 48 ,243 66% 3.92%
1966 261 ,687 38 00% 48 .82% 51 ,256 6 25% 10.16%
1967 278 ,145 6 00% 55 .11% 49 ,788 (2 86%) 7.30%
1968 307 ,252 10 00% 65 .57% 47 ,983 (3 .63%) 3.67%
1969 309 ,771 82% 66 .39% 49 ,908 4 .00% 7.68%
1970 259 737 (16 15%; | 50 .24% 48 , 575 (2 .67%) 5.01%
1971 212 ,369 (18 24%, I 32 .00% 47 ,761 (1 .68%) 3.34%
1972 198 ,238 (6 65%, 1 25 .35% 41 ,484 (13 14%) (9.80%)
1973 196 098 (1 08%, 1 24 .27% 38 ,196 (7 .93%) (17.73%)
1974 188 802 (3 72%; I 20 .55% 31 ,896 (16 49%) (34.22%)
1975 195 951 (3 79%; 1 24 34% 33 ,089 3 74% (30.48%)
1976 192; 336 (1 84%, 22 49% 26 ,849 (18 .86%) (49.34%)
1977 191; 641 (0 36%; 22 .13% 31 ,687 18 02% (31.32%)
1978 190 755 (0. 46%, 21 .67% 33 ,403 5 .42% (25.91%)
1979 185; 187 (2 92%, 18 .75% 34 ,280 2 .63% (23.28%)
1980 188; 469 1. 77% 20 .52% 37 ,038 8 .05% (15.24%)
1981 190; 620 1. 14% 21 .66% 37 ,049 .03% (15.21%)
1982 192; 059 0. 75% 22 42% 40 ,461 9 .21% (6. 00%)
1983 194, 089 1. 07% 23 .47% 42 , 690 5 51% (0.49%)
1984 196; 189 1. 08% 24 56% 40 ,619 (4 .85%) (5.34%)
1985 198; 025 94% 25 49% 41 ,586 2 .38% (2.96%)
1986 198; 814 0. 40% 25 89% 41 ,582 (0 01%) (2.97%)
1987 199; 527 0. 36% 26 25% 42 ,253 1 61% (1.36%)
1988 197; 350 (1. 09%; 25 16% 43 ,556 3 08% 1.73%
1989 195; 558 (0. 91%; 24 ^ D *6 43 ,576 05% 1.77%
1990 196; 652 0. 56% 24 81% 44 530 2. 19% 3.96%
1991 195; 000 (0. 84%; 23 97% 43 973 (1- 25%) 2.71%
1992 184; 590 (5. 34%; 18 63% 42 ,572 (3. 19%) (0.47%)
1993 178; 379 (3. 36%; 15 27% 41 854 (1- 69%) (2.16%)
1994 174; 100 (2. 40%; 12. 87% 42 000 0. 35% (1.81%)
1995 174, 000 (0. 06%; 12. 81% 42 000 0% (1.81%)
1996 174, 000 0% 12. 81% 42 000 0% (1.81%)
1997 174, 000 0% 12. 81% 42 000 0% (1.81%)
1998 174, 000 0% 12. 81% 42 000 0% (1.81%)
1999 174, 000 0% 12. 81% 42, 000 0% (1.81%)
Sources: Budget of the United States (iovcrruiient (series) 1960-1993 and FY1994 Future Years Defense Program
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within the Department of Defense have decreased. (See Table 7.2
and Figure 7.3 and 7.4) When taking inflation into account,
funding for the Department of Defense has been declining since the
mid-1980 's.
The operation and maintenance funding for the active and
reserve components from 1960 to 1999 takes on virtually the same
pattern as the MPMC and RPMC appropriations. Looking at the
curves, one can see the similar patterns. (See Table 7.3 and
Figures 7.5 and 7.6)
C. CONCLUSION
Now that all the data has been analyzed, what does it all
mean? The graphs indicate differences and similarities throughout
the decades between the reserve and active duty appropriations.
But most importantly, they show the relationship between the active
and reserve appropriations and also the emphasis placed on these
appropriations throughout the four decades in question.
Throughout history, Reserve Forces in various countries have
had to face the stigma of being classified as second class citizens
by the regular military establishment. Because of their part-time
service they have consistently faced contempt from their active
duty counterparts for not being as competent or as professional.
The Marine Corps Reserve, inspite of decades of solid performance,




Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve)
($000)
1960-1999
Year MPMC Change %Cum Change RPMC Change %Cum Change
1960 597 ,962 0% 0% 24 ,066 0% 0%
1961 602
r
063 .69% .69% 24 ,385 1 .33% 1. 33%
1962 639 ,330 5 .83% 6 .88% 25 ,994 6 .60% 7 92%
1963 664
r
740 3 .97% 10 .85% 26 ,662 2 .57% 10. 49%
1964 725
r
424 9 .13% 19 .98% 29 ,497 10 .63% 21. 13%
1965 753 ,392 3 .86% 23 .83% 30 ,899 4 .75% 25. 88%
1966 978 ,247 29 .85% 53 .68% 36 , 133 16 .94% 42. 82%
1967 1 ,250 ,378 27 .89% 81 .50% 36 ,933 2 .21% 45. 03%
1968 1
r
430 ,689 14 .42% 95 .92% 35 ,875 (2 .86%) 42..17%
1969 1
r
534 ,734 7 .27% 103 .19% 36 ,357 1 .34% 43 .51%
1970 1 ,627 084 6 .02% 109 .21% 48 ,847 34 .35% 77 87%
1971 1 ,461, 640 (10 17%) 99 .04% 53 ,672 9 88% 87 74%
1972 1 ,455, 792 (0 40%) 98 64% 58 , 144 8 .33% 96. 08%
1973 1 ,577, 722 8 38% 107 02% 68 ,375 17 .60% 113. 67%
1974 1, 660, 636 5 26% 112 27% 60 ,490 (11 53%) 102. 14%
1975 1, 745, 766 5. 17% 117 40% 65 ,122 7 66% 109. 80%
1976 1, 851, 277 6. 04% 123 44% 70 ,967 8 98% 118. 77%
1977 1, 900, 124 2. 64% 126 08% 73 ,697 4 23% 123. 00%
1978 2, 013, 704 5. 98% 132 06% 82 ,196 11 13% 134. 12%
1979 2, 098, 462 4 , 21% 136 27% 83 ,903 2 08% 136. 20%
1980 2, 235, 310 6. 52% 142 79% 96 ,090 14 .53% 150. 73%
1981 2, 666, 610 19. 29% 162. 08% 118 ,955 23 80% 174. 52%
1982 3, 111, 829 16. 70% 178 78% 151 ,281 27 .17% 201. 70%
1983 3< 347, 565 7. 58% 186 35% 169 ,889 12 .30% 214. 00%
1984 3, 516, 338 5. 04% 191 40% 172 ,248 1 39% 215. 39%
1985 4, 952, 473 40. 84% 232. 24% 269 ,930 56 71% 272. 10%
1986 5, 161, 083 4. 21% 236. 45% 283 ,045 4 86% 276. 95%
1987 5, 438, 786 5. 3 8 "6 241. 83% 277 ,316 (2 02%) 274. 93%
1988 5, 562, 912 2. 28% 244. 11% 294 ,200 6 09% 281. 02%
1989 5, 678, 983 2. 09% 246. 20% 314 ,980 7. 06% 288. 08%
1990 5< 798, 822 2. 11% 248. 31% 314 , 383 (0 19%) 287. 89%
1991 6, 374, 780 9. 93% 258. 24% 285 ,685 (9 13%) 278. 76%
1992 6, 102, 580 (4. 27%) 253. 97% 345 ,007 20 76% 299. 53%
1993 5, 980, 998 (1. 99%) 251. 98% 347 , 103 61% 300. 14%
1994 5, 678, 700 (5. 05%) 246. 93% 350 ,569 1 00% 301. 14%
1995 5, 686, 490 0. 14% 247. 06% 343 ,84 3 (1 92%) 299. 22%
1996 5, 774, 964 1. 56% 248. 62% 350 ,936 2. 06% 301. 28%
1997 5, 831, 611 0. 98% 249. 60% 355 ,924 1. 42% 302. 70%
1998 5, 962, 734 1. 73% 251. 33% 364 ,077 2. 29% 304. 99%
1999 6, 062, 098 1. 67% 253. 01% 371 ,212 1. 96% 306. 95%
Sources: ] Judgi;t of the I 'niled Slates Government (series) 1960-1993 and FY 1994 Future Years Defense Program
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Marine Corps & M
TABLE 7.3
(Active and Reserve) 1960-1999
($000)
Year Active Change %Cum Change Reserve Change %Cum Change
1960 165 ,041 0% 0% 4 ,647 0% 0%
1961 171
r
161 3 .71% 3 .71% 4 ,262 (8 .28%) (8 .28%)
1962 181
r
093 5 .80% 9 .51% 4 ,565 7 .11% (1 .18%)
1963 182 ,592 .83% 10 .34% 4 ,550 (0 .33%) (1 .50%)
1964 185 ,088 1 .33% 11 .71% 4 ,802 5 .54% 4 .03%
1965 189 ,225 2 .24% 13 .94% 4 ,769 (0 .69%) 3 .35%
1966 327 ,479 73 .06% 87 .00% 5 ,097 6 .88% 10 <L £ ~Q
1967 423 ,298 29 .26% 116 .26% 5 856 14 .89% 25 .12%
1968 427 ,322 .95% 117 .21% 6 ,637 13 ,34% 38 .45%
1969 452 ,751 5 .95% 123 .17% 5 999 (9 61%) 28 .84%
1970 400,,219 (11 .60%) 111 . 56% 6 395 6 .60% 34 .44%
1971 394, 727 (1 .37%) 110 .19% 8 ,601 34 50% 69 .94%
1972 353, 191 (10 .52%) 101 .93% 8 094 (5 ,89%) 64 .04%
1973 383, 139 8 .48% 107 .73% 7 945 (1 .84%) 62 .20%
1974 441, 540 15 .24% 122 .98% 12 094 52 .22% 114 42%
1975 458, 869 3 92% 126 .90% 11 611 (3 .99%) 110 .43%
1976 512, 203 11 .62% 138 .52% 11 739 1 .10% 111 .53%
1977 591, 313 15 ,45% 153 .97% 15 008 27 .85% 139 38%
1978 657, 517 11 20% 165 .17% 16 257 8 .32% 147 .70%
1979 745, 082 13 ,32% 178 ,48% 19 660 20 .93% 168 .63%
1980 880, 167 18 13% 196 .61% 21 155 7 .60% 176 .24%
1981 1 ,089, 839 23 82% 220 .44% 28, 594 35 .16% 211 .40%
1982 1 ,181, 103 8 37% 228 81% 39 762 39 .06% 250 .46%
1983 1 ,479, 412 25 26% 254 .07% 50 453 26 .89% 277 .35%
1984 1 ,559, 971 5 45% 259 51% 52, 111 3 29% 280 .63%
1985 1 ,657, 778 6. 27% 265 78% 58, 669 12 .58% 293 .22%
1986 1 ,575, 629 (4. 93%) 260 83% 54, 357 (V 35%) 285 .87%
1987 1 ,841, 427 16 87% 277 70% 63, 978 17 70% 303 .57%
1988 1 ,800, 488 (2 22%) 275 47% 69, 500 8 ,63% 312 .20%
1989 1 ,839, 947 2 19% 277 66% 77, 417 11 39% 323 59%
1990 1
r 850, 507 0. 57% 278. 24% 78, 382 1. 25% 324 .84%
1991 3 ,225, 182 74. 29% 352. 52% 84, 696 8. 06% 332 89%
1992 2 ,146, 464 (33. 45%) 319. 08% 92, 833 9. 61% 342 50%
1993 1 ,976, 330 (7. 93%) 311, 15% 80, 035 (13. 79%) 328 .71%
1994 1 ,818, 000 (8. 01%) 303. 14% 75, 100 (6. 17%) 322 .55%
1995 1 ,745, 146 (4 01%) 299. 13% 78, 518 4. 55% 327 .10%
1996 1 ,893, 768 8 52% 307. 65% 80, 480 2. 50% 329 60%
1997 1 ,988, 799 5 02% 312. 67% 82, 331 2. 30% 331 90%
1998 2 ,035, 417 2 34% 315 01% 84, 225 2. 30% 334 20%
1999 2 ,137, 167 5 00% 320 01% 86, 163 2. 30% 336 50%
Sources: Budget of the IJnitex) States Government (series) 1960-1993 and FY 1994 Future Years I)efense Prog rant
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Barbara W. Tuchman, in The Guns of August , shows the regular
establishment's contempt for reservists during the World War I era
from the German and French perspective:
Reserves mixed with active troops would create 'armies of
decadence, ' incapable of the will to conquer. . . . Similar
sentiments were known to be held across the Rhine. The Kaiser
was widely credited with the edict 'no fathers at the front.'
Among the French General Staff it was an article of faith that
the Germans would not mix reserve units with active units. 30
In 1973, Chief Warrant Officer William K. Laird, further explains
that:
The attitude and fact that the reservist is a second-class
serviceman permeates the program from the Congress down to the
individual. Let's be realistic and stop vilifying the
reservist as if he were somewhat less patriotic than his
regular counterpart. 31
In 1981, Captain L.A. Johnson writes that:
There exists a school of thought that maintains or implies that
reservists are second-class citizens. It is a widespread
pervasive school of thought and one that needs to be
dispelled. 32
In 1991 LtCol. M.F. Cancian writes about Marine reservists in
Operation Desert Storm/Shield by saying that "... many reservists
felt that the regulars did not treat them as a member of the
team." 33 He continues by commenting that:
Active duty commanders should know that reservists are
hypersensitive, even a bit paranoid about being considered
30Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August , Macmillan Publishing
Company, New York, 1962, p. 32.
31CWO William K. Laird, "Cure Offered for Reserves," Marine
Corps Gazette . Vol. 57, No. 8, August 1973., p. 52.
32Capt. L.A. Johnson, "Second-Class Citizen," Marine Corps
Gazette . Vol. 65, No. 8, August 1981, p. 58.
33LtCol. M.F. Cancian, Forces in Southwest Asia , p. 56.
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second class citizens. Even casual slights or 'good natured
'
kidding can be misinterpreted. Strong action is needed to
prevent an 'us' v. 'them' atoraosphere from arising. 34
Even though this "us" v. "them" syndrome continous to exist, the
data throughout the four decades sheds some light on the reliance
and responsibility that has been shouldered by the reserves.
This reliance on the reserves is directly predicated on the
existing military strategy of the time. It should be noted that
the Marine Corps is a force in readiness, prepared to move quickly
at any given time to any part of the world. With such a mission,
and such short response time, the reserves find themselves at a
disadvantage because of the long lead times required to mobilize
the reserves. The Marine Corps, as opposed to the Army, is much
less dependent on its reserve force. Therefore any lack of
reliance or perceived lack of reliance on the reserves is much more
a factor of its mission as opposed to blatant disregard for the
reserves.
The objective during the Cold War was the containment of
communism. The strategies that were implemented in accomplishing
this objective were continously evolving. Throughout the 1960's
and the early 1970' s the probability of nuclear war was very
likely, but not until the mid to late 1970 's, when the United
States and the Soviet Union realized that any nuclear war would
mean mututal destruction, did military planners start espousing a
strategy geared towards a conventional war. This conventional war
- 4Ibid., p. 56.
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scenario envisioned long protracted battles fought on European
soil. Such a scenario lends itself much more to the mobilization
of reserves because enough time is available to mobilize them.
!But with the demise of the Soviet Union, military planners
have changed their strategy once again. As per the Clinton
Administration's Bottom-Up review, Marine Corps end strength is
expected to drop to 174,000 by 1995, down from its post Vietnam
peak in 1987 of 199,527. The reserve end strength is expected to
remain steady at 42,000 from 1994 to 1999, still a decrease from
its post Vietnam high of 44,530 in 1990. Future scenarios are
predicted to be small regional conflicts with quick response times.
LtCol. Cancian explains:
The assumption for these regional conflicts is for short
warning times and short conflicts. This requires very
responsive forces. No longer is it 'better late than never,'
but rather 'better never than late' i.e., forces that cannot
deploy rapidly are not worth maintaining. 3S
Although LtCol. Cancian sees the 1990 's as not very good years for
the Marine Corps Reserve, if one looks at the end strength numbers,
one can definitely see that relative decreases in end strength have
tended to favor the reserves. Additionally, with defense dollars
becoming smaller, the Pentagon has continously tried to cut the
reserves in proportion with the regular establishment, but
Congress continues to support the reserves both in end strength and
funding.
With this congressional support, the Marine Corps Reserve has
remained a viable force in support of the active component.
35Ibid., p. 3.
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In July 1992 the Marine Reserve Force was established. Major
General J.W. Oster, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs, explains that:
Marine Reserve Force provides a single point of contact through
which the Commandant, as the Service Chief, can discharge his
responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy for the timely
provision of trained and eguipped Reserve units and individuals
to the combatant commands. Consolidation of Marine Reserve
assets under a single headguarters provides better visibility
of available resources and reduces the potential for
overcommitment and disruption of contingency plan execution.
Marine Reserve Force streamlines the Reserve Component and
eliminates duplicate functions among various staffs. It also
increases command opportunities for senior Reserve Component
officers. Command and control of the Reserve Component is
strengthened as a result of the activation of Marine Reserve
Force. 36
With this streamlining of its command structure and the continued
emphasis on the Total Force Policy, the Marine Corps Reserve is
positioned to support the active component throughout the 1990' s.
Some have argued that as the active component decreases, the
reserves should be increased in order to maintain a strong military
capability and at the same time save on manpower costs. For the
Marine Corps that would be a mistake. Because the Marine Corps
thrives on its guick response time to deploy to any part of the
world, increased reliability on the reserves would negatively
affect capability. Additionally, as the active component
decreases, the manpower pool of prior service personnel would
shrink and the reserves would be reguired to recruit personnel
without prior military service. In essence, the relationship
between active and reserve components as it exists today, allows
36Statement by MGen. J.W. Oster, 28 April 1993, Hearings
before the House Armed Services Committee, p. 4.
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the Marine Corps to accomplish its mission. Also, any drastic
reductions in the reserve component would deviate from the Total
Force Policy, . . . From the Sea (Navy-Marine Corps policy document)
,
and current congressional opinion.
Without question, from 1960 to the present, the Total Force
Policy has been the key toward increased reliance on the reserves.
End strength and funding data in this thesis illustrate this
increased reliance. Because reserves are generally cheaper than
their active duty counterparts, Congress in its attempt to save
money, deal with the national budget deficit, and maintain its
constituency, will ensure that the reserves receive adequate
support and remain a viable entity.
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